South China Sea

SITUATIONAL SUMMARY

The South China Sea is experiencing heightened military tensions in early 2026, centered on competing sovereignty claims between China and the Philippines, with significant involvement from the United States and Japan. The core driver is the Philippines' assumption of the 2026 ASEAN chairmanship under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., which has coincided with intensified confrontations rather than the diplomatic leadership Manila promised.

Between late January and early February 2026, the People's Liberation Army Southern Theater Command conducted five consecutive days of naval and air patrols (February 2-6) in response to what China characterizes as the Philippines "organizing so-called 'bilateral air patrols' with external countries." This followed earlier Chinese operations on January 25-26 and January 31 around Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao), which China claims as sovereign territory but the Philippines asserts lies within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On December 12, 2025, multiple Philippine vessels approached Second Thomas Shoal (Xianbin Reef) in the Spratly Islands, prompting Chinese Coast Guard warnings and forced departures.

China's position, articulated consistently across state media sources, frames these operations as defensive responses to Philippine provocations backed by external powers. Chinese analysts emphasize that Scarborough Shoal is "an inseparable part of Chinese territory" based on post-World War II declarations (the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation of 1946), and that China has established territorial sea baselines around the feature and designated it a national nature reserve. Beijing accuses the Marcos government of "adventurism" and "extremism," particularly criticizing Manila's military exercises that include Scarborough Shoal in their coverage area and its deepening security ties with the United States and Japan.

The Philippine perspective, though not directly represented in these Chinese sources, is characterized by Beijing as relying on the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling—which China dismisses as an "illegal" political farce that violated international law principles. The Philippines has recently passed a "Maritime Zones Act" incorporating Scarborough Shoal and most Spratly features into its maritime zones, and an "Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act" that China claims violates international navigation rights.

Japan's role has expanded significantly. According to Wu Shicun, chairman of the China-South China Sea Studies Initiative's academic committee, Japan has moved from claiming neutrality on South China Sea disputes (as recently as 2012) to active military involvement. Japan and the Philippines signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement in September 2025, with discussions underway for a Visiting Forces Agreement that would allow regular Japanese Self-Defense Force deployments. Japan has constructed an ammunition depot on Palawan Island, approximately 200 kilometers from Scarborough Shoal, and Japanese judge Shunji Yanai served as president of the arbitration tribunal that issued the 2016 ruling. Wu characterizes Japan's involvement as "very negative and destructive."

The United States maintains its position that the 2016 arbitration ruling is binding and that attacks on Philippine vessels or aircraft would trigger the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Chinese sources note that Trump's second administration has continued Biden-era policies, with increased emphasis on military measures including joint exercises, base construction, weapons sales, and intelligence sharing.

A notable incident illustrates the complexity: when a Singapore-flagged cargo ship capsized near Scarborough Shoal with 21 Filipino crew members, Chinese Coast Guard rescued 17 people. However, Philippine Coast Guard spokesmen simultaneously thanked China while accusing it of "intimidation, harassment, or obstruction" of vessels—a response Chinese commentators cite as evidence of Manila's contradictory approach.

China has also made technological advances relevant to South China Sea operations. On February 7, 2026, the Chinese Academy of Sciences' South China Sea Institute and China University of Petroleum unveiled "Flying Fish-1.0," described as the world's first AI ocean forecasting model with "sea-air bidirectional coupling" specifically for the South China Sea. The system can generate three-day forecasts in three seconds using only three years of training data, compared to 20+ years required by comparable models, and outperforms European and American systems (GLORYS12 and HYCOM) in predicting temperature, salinity, and currents in the upper 500 meters of ocean.

The framing differences are stark: Chinese sources present a narrative of patient restraint against provocations, emphasizing China's historical claims, legal position, and preference for dialogue while portraying the Philippines as a destabilizing actor manipulated by external powers. Western and Philippine narratives (referenced but not directly quoted in these sources) frame China as an aggressive expansionist power violating international law and threatening smaller neighbors. Wu Shicun acknowledges that while the overall South China Sea situation remains stable with China as the stabilizing force, "localized turbulence" and "small-scale crises" remain possible, particularly as claimant states attempt to consolidify positions before a Code of Conduct is finalized.

HISTORICAL PARALLELS

The 1995-1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

In 1995-1996, China conducted large-scale military exercises and missile tests in waters near Taiwan in response to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and perceived moves toward formal independence. The United States responded by deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region—the most significant U.S. military demonstration in Asia since the Vietnam War. The crisis featured China using military exercises to signal resolve over sovereignty claims while testing U.S. commitment to regional allies, with both sides ultimately stepping back from direct confrontation but without resolving underlying disputes.

The current South China Sea situation mirrors this dynamic in several key ways. China is conducting sustained naval and air patrols (five consecutive days in February 2026) to demonstrate sovereignty claims and operational control, similar to the 1995-96 exercises. The Philippines, like Taiwan then, is strengthening security ties with the United States and other external powers (Japan, Canada) to counterbalance Chinese pressure. The U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines under the Mutual Defense Treaty parallels its implicit commitment to Taiwan, creating similar risks of miscalculation. Both situations involve China using "salami-slicing" tactics—incremental actions that individually seem manageable but cumulatively shift the status quo.

However, critical differences exist. The Taiwan Strait crisis involved a single flashpoint and clearer red lines (Taiwan independence), while the South China Sea involves multiple disputed features and overlapping claims among several countries. The 1995-96 crisis resolved through tacit understanding that both sides would avoid further escalation, with China demonstrating its capabilities and the U.S. showing commitment, but neither side achieving their maximal objectives. This suggests the current South China Sea tensions may similarly stabilize through demonstration of resolve without resolution of underlying disputes, though the multi-party nature makes de-escalation coordination more complex.

The Cod Wars Between Iceland and the United Kingdom (1958-1976)

The Cod Wars consisted of three confrontations between Iceland and the United Kingdom over fishing rights and maritime jurisdiction in the North Atlantic. Iceland progressively extended its exclusive fishing zone from 4 to 12 nautical miles (1958), then to 50 miles (1972), and finally to 200 miles (1975), each time prompting British resistance. The conflicts involved coast guard vessels ramming each other, net-cutting, and Iceland threatening to close the NATO base at Keflavík. Despite Britain's overwhelming military superiority, Iceland prevailed by leveraging its strategic importance to NATO during the Cold War and the emerging international consensus around 200-mile EEZs that would be codified in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

This parallel illuminates the Philippines' strategy of leveraging external powers and international law frameworks against a militarily superior China. Like Iceland, the Philippines is attempting to use legal instruments (the 2016 arbitration ruling, new maritime laws) and alliance relationships (U.S., Japan) to compensate for conventional military weakness. The Philippines' positioning as ASEAN chair in 2026 parallels Iceland's use of its NATO base as leverage—both seek to make their strategic value to larger powers outweigh the costs of supporting their maritime claims. China's rejection of the arbitration ruling mirrors Britain's initial rejection of Iceland's extensions, though Britain ultimately accepted the new norms.

The Cod Wars resolved through Iceland's victory as international law evolved to support its position, Britain calculated that maintaining NATO cohesion outweighed fishing rights, and both sides avoided military escalation despite aggressive coast guard tactics. This suggests several possibilities for the South China Sea: international law evolution could eventually favor either position; the Philippines' alliance value may prove decisive; or sustained low-intensity confrontations could continue indefinitely without resolution. The key difference is that the Cod Wars involved bilateral disputes over resources with clear legal trends, while the South China Sea involves sovereignty claims, great power competition, and no emerging international consensus—making resolution through legal evolution less likely.

SCENARIO ANALYSIS

MOST LIKELY: Managed Confrontation with Incremental Chinese Consolidation

Drawing from both the Taiwan Strait crisis pattern of demonstration-without-escalation and the Cod Wars' lesson that military superiority doesn't guarantee outcomes, the most probable trajectory is sustained low-intensity confrontations that gradually normalize expanded Chinese operational control without triggering major conflict.

This scenario reflects China's demonstrated pattern of incremental assertion combined with restraint at critical thresholds. The five-day continuous patrols in February 2026 represent a new normal—more sustained than previous responses but calibrated to avoid triggering U.S. intervention under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Like the post-1996 Taiwan Strait situation, both sides will demonstrate resolve through military activities while maintaining communication channels to prevent accidents from escalating. The Philippines will continue provocative actions (vessel approaches, overflight attempts, joint exercises with external powers) to maintain international attention and alliance commitments, while China will respond with increasingly routine patrols and coast guard actions that gradually establish de facto control without dramatic escalation.

The historical parallel to the Taiwan Strait crisis is instructive: after 1996, China continued military modernization and expanded operations near Taiwan, but both sides developed tacit understandings about thresholds. Similarly, China and the Philippines will likely develop informal boundaries of acceptable confrontation—close encounters and verbal warnings without kinetic exchanges, sustained patrols without permanent occupation of disputed features, and legal/diplomatic protests without severing economic ties. Wu Shicun's assessment that "the overall peace and stability pattern in the South China Sea will not undergo subversive changes in five to ten years" because "China can hold steady" supports this trajectory.

The trigger events pushing toward this scenario are already occurring: the Philippines' 2026 ASEAN chairmanship creating pressure to appear strong on sovereignty while maintaining regional relationships; China's deployment of advanced capabilities (AI forecasting, sustained patrol capacity) that make expanded operations routine rather than extraordinary; and the Trump administration's continuation of Biden-era policies without dramatic escalation. The Marcos government's domestic political troubles (corruption scandals, Vice President Sara Duterte's opposition) may actually reinforce this pattern by making nationalist posturing on South China Sea issues politically valuable while economic dependence on China constrains actual escalation.

KEY CLAIM: By December 2026, China will have established a pattern of continuous monthly patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal that the Philippines protests but does not physically contest, with at least three incidents of Chinese Coast Guard forcing Philippine vessels to withdraw without shots fired.

FORECAST HORIZON: Medium-term (3-12 months)

KEY INDICATORS:

1. Patrol frequency normalization: Chinese Southern Theater Command announcements shift from highlighting individual patrol operations as responses to specific provocations to routine monthly or bi-weekly patrol schedules published in advance, similar to Japan's publication of Self-Defense Force activities.

2. Philippine tactical adaptation: Manila reduces the frequency of vessel approaches to contested features while increasing aerial surveillance and joint exercises with external partners in less contested areas, signaling acceptance of a new operational reality while maintaining legal claims and alliance relationships.

WILDCARD: Kinetic Incident Triggering Limited U.S.-China Military Exchange

While less probable, a scenario involving actual weapons discharge between Chinese and Philippine forces, followed by limited U.S. military involvement, would fundamentally reshape regional security architecture. This draws from the Cod Wars' pattern of escalating physical confrontations and the Taiwan Strait crisis's demonstration that great powers will deploy military assets when core interests are threatened.

The specific pathway would involve a Philippine vessel or aircraft refusing Chinese Coast Guard orders to leave contested waters, leading to warning shots or water cannon use that causes casualties. Unlike previous incidents, this one occurs during a joint U.S.-Philippine exercise or when U.S. forces are nearby, creating immediate pressure for American response under the Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. conducts a "freedom of navigation operation" with armed escort of Philippine vessels, leading to a standoff where Chinese and American naval vessels are in close proximity with weapons systems activated. A brief exchange of fire occurs—likely initiated by mid-level commanders rather than strategic decision—resulting in damage to vessels but limited casualties before both sides pull back.

This scenario is informed by the Taiwan Strait crisis's lesson that both powers will demonstrate military commitment to regional allies, but also by the critical difference that the South China Sea involves actual ongoing physical confrontations (unlike Taiwan's primarily political crisis in 1995-96). The Cod Wars showed that even close allies (UK and Iceland in NATO) can have violent maritime confrontations, and that coast guard/naval encounters can escalate beyond political leaders' intentions. Wu Shicun's warning that "localized turbulence" and "small-scale crises" remain possible, combined with his observation that the Philippines is conducting "unprecedented" large-scale exercises including Scarborough Shoal, suggests the ingredients for miscalculation exist.

The trigger events would be: (1) a Philippine vessel sustaining damage or casualties during a Chinese Coast Guard operation, creating domestic pressure on Marcos to respond more forcefully; (2) this occurring during a period of heightened U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan or trade issues, reducing both sides' willingness to show restraint; (3) the involvement of Japanese forces in Philippine exercises, which China has identified as particularly provocative, creating a three-way dynamic where each party misreads others' intentions. The Trump administration's emphasis on military responses over diplomatic engagement increases the probability that Washington would respond kinetically rather than solely through diplomatic channels.

The resolution would likely follow the Taiwan Strait pattern: both sides demonstrate resolve, establish new operational parameters, but pull back from sustained conflict. However, the aftermath would include permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines (beyond current rotational deployments), accelerated Japanese military involvement, and Chinese establishment of permanent installations on contested features—fundamentally changing the status quo that has persisted since 2016.

KEY CLAIM: Between March and August 2026, a confrontation between Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine vessels results in at least one fatality, prompting a U.S. naval deployment that leads to a weapons-lock incident between U.S. and Chinese warships, followed by both sides establishing permanent increased military presence in the South China Sea.

FORECAST HORIZON: Medium-term (3-12 months)

KEY INDICATORS:

1. Casualty incident with political consequences: A Philippine servicemember or civilian is killed or seriously injured during a South China Sea confrontation, leading to emergency Philippine cabinet meetings and public statements from U.S. officials explicitly invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty with specific operational commitments.

2. Rapid military deployment: Within 72 hours of a confrontation, the U.S. deploys carrier strike group assets to the South China Sea with announced plans for "extended presence operations," while China simultaneously announces "special patrol operations" with published coordinates overlapping U.S. operational areas, creating conditions for close encounters between major surface combatants rather than coast guard vessels.

KEY TAKEAWAY

The South China Sea situation in early 2026 represents not a sudden crisis but the maturation of a long-term Chinese strategy to establish operational control through sustained, calibrated military presence that stays below the threshold of triggering major power intervention. What appears as Philippine "provocation" in Chinese sources and Chinese "aggression" in Western framing is actually a complex dance where the Philippines leverages alliance relationships and international law to compensate for military weakness, while China leverages military superiority and historical claims to gradually normalize expanded control—with both sides constrained by economic interdependence and awareness that actual conflict serves neither's interests. The critical variable is not the bilateral China-Philippines dynamic, which follows predictable patterns, but rather how the deepening involvement of Japan and the operational implications of Trump administration policies create new possibilities for miscalculation that neither Beijing nor Manila fully controls.